The 80s was a wild time for hash in Montreal. In 1986, the RCMP confiscated a 14-ton truckload of hashish on Cape Breton Island, and another 16 tons from a ship at the Halifax port. The captain of the ship told police that he had to pay off senior militia officers with the Christian Phalangists in Lebanon to get the shipment out of the country. Like the West End Gang, the Montreal mafia had direct ties with hashish exporters in Lebanon that date back to the 1970s. According to a 1989 Montreal Gazzette article, members of the Montreal mafia established a mutually beneficial trading partnership with Lebanese Christian Phalangist militias, which bartered hash for weapons and cash.

In 1980, the FBI confirmed that a large shipment of weapons including m16s and ammunition had been stolen from a Boston armoury, smuggled to Montreal, and then sent to Lebanon in exchange for hashish. Police also established a link between Frank Cotroni and senior figures in Lebanon’s government and military. Wiretaps on Frank Cotroni’s phone in the mid-1970s revealed that he was making calls directly to the home of Suleiman Franjieh, who at the time was president of Lebanon. Cotroni also allegedly made several trips during the 1970s to Lebanon to organize hash shipments with senior Lebanese officials.

In early December 1987, a two-month investigation by the RCMP resulted in the seizure of 13 metric tons of Lebanese hash off the Newfoundland coast and the arrest of size Montreal men. The investigation began in October when RCMP officers seized 500 kilos of hash from a trawler at the port of Blanc Sablon, Quebec, on the north coast of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, near Labrador. The seizure led the RCMP to suspect that large hash shipments were being loaded aboard small craft in the area from mother ships anchored in international waters off the coast of Newfoundland. Following tips from fishermen about unusual ship traffic around Trinity Bay, the RCMP made a series of other seizures from boats and trucks in Newfoundland in late November. Among those charged in connection with the seizures were Vito Rizzuto and thirty-four-year old Raynald Desjardins, the man police alleged to be in charge of the importations. Desjardins was not merely a drug importer; he has been described as “the most influential non-italian in the Montreal mafia since William Obront and Armand Courville.” He was the brother-in-law of long-time mob member Joe Di Maulo and, in 1973, he and Di Maulo accompanied Paolo Violi to New York City to participate in the election of Phil Rastelli as the new boss of the Bonanno Family.

On November 18, 1988, while out on $150,000 bail from his 1987 arrest, Rizzuto was again arrested for conspiring to smuggle 32 metric tons of Lebanese hash into the country, which police believe was scheduled to land in Sept-Iles, Quebec. Police charged him solely on the word of Normand Dupuis, the owner and captain of the boat where the drugs were found. Rizzuto was acquitted of all charges in December 1989, after Dupuis was caught on tape making an offer to Jean Salois, Rizzuto’s laywer. He was trying to persuade Salois to provide him with a “lifetime pension” if he would agree to disappear before Rizzuto’s trial. Salois had already been contacted by Dupuis and had a tape recorder running when the offer was made in person in his office. Salois took the tapes to police, who in turn handed them over to prosecutors. Their star witness no longer had any credibility and the decision was made to drop the charges against Rizzuto. It was Dupuis who would go to jain on a thirty-two-month sentence for obstructing justice (on top of his sentence for the drug charges).

Adnan Khashoggi is almost a cartoon of the Saudi wheelerdealer: a sometime venture capitalist and arms middleman, ridiculously rich and unapologetic. One day Khashoggi turns up in the newspapers accused of obtaining $64 million in illegal loans from the collapsed Bangkok Bank of commerce. The next day he’s in the New York society columns, attending charity balls in the Hamptons and donating millions to help American farmers.

The son of personal physician of Ibn Sa’ud, who founded the modern Saudi Kingdom in 1932, Khashoggi was serving by the mid-1970s as middleman on an estimated 80 percent of all arms deals between the United States and Saudi Arabia. From Lockheed alone, he pocketed $106 million in commissions from 1970 to 1975. Northrop officials told a Senate subcommittee looking into foreign payments by U.S. corporations that it had given Khashoggi $450,000 to bribe Saudi Generals into buying the company’s wares – an allegation that didn’t prevent the Reagan administration from using Khashoggi as its own middleman during the Iran-Contra fiasco. (Having served as basically a pimp for the Shah of Iran in the 1970s, Khashoggi knew how to cut a dirty deal as well as anyone.)

In the late 1970s Khashoggi made a splash by trying to donate nearly $600,000 to three prestigious Philadelphia-area colleges (Swarthmore, Haverford and Bryn Mawr) to establish a Middle East studies program that would create understanding and sympathy for the Arab point of view. That plan fell apart the Northrop bribe charges surfaced. Undeterred, the civic-minded Khashoggi jumped back into higher education in 1984 with a $5 million gift to American University, on Massachusetts Avenue in D.C., halfway between the White House and the Beltway. AU had planned to honor Khashoggi’s money by naming the school’s new sports center and convocation hall after him, but administrators changed their minds in the wake of the Iran-Contra hearings. Even universities have consciences, apparently.

By January 1987, when Time put Khashoggi on its cover as the prototype of the new international operator, he was a regular at Marbella, the jet-set-hot retreat on the Spanish Riviera, where he maintained a five-thousand-acre estate. Other addresses included Paris, Cannes, Madrid, the Canary Islands, Rome, Beirut, Riyadh, Jeddah, Monte Carlo, a 180,000-acre ranch in Kenya, and a $30 million thirty-thousand-square-foot apartment on Fifth Avenue in New York with a pool overlooking the spires of Saint Patrick’s Cathedral. To get to and among his many homes, Khashoggi had his choice of the 282-foot yacht Nabila, the same one used in the James Bond movie Never Say Never Again; a DC-8, where he could rest on a ten-foot-wide bed beneath a $200,000 spread of Russian sable; two other commercial-size jets; twelve Mercedes stretch limos; and so on. (Time estimated the cost of Khashoggi’s lifestyle at $250,000 a day in early 1987, servants included, or a little over $91 million a year, roughly a quarter of the annual budget of Haiti) At Marbella, there was a small warehouse devoted to nothing but the Saudi’s wardrobe: over a thousand handmade suits alone, cleaned, pressed, encased in plastic, and ready to be shipped to any golden shore where their owner might happen to wash up for a few nights or more.

In late 1968, days after Richard Nixon won the White House, Khashoggi was one of the first to fly out to congratulate the president-elect. He didn’t forget to pass on the regards of Interior Minister Fahd, the prince who’d sent him to San Clemente and the current brain-dead king. When Khashoggi got up to leave, he “forgot” his briefcase, which happened to be stuffed with $11 million in hundreds. No one said a word. Khashoggi went back to his hotel to wait for a telephone call. The phone never rang. It never would. A couple days later, and Khashoggi knew the trick had worked: Washington was for sale.

In a brilliant technological triumph, the American-supplied FIM-92 helped swing the balance of power towards the mujahideen during the Soviet War. Such an effective deterrent to Soviet air domination was a crippling blow to red momentum and it eventually lead to a current of mujahideen guerilla warfare victories.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002572 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ELA, R, S/P

Catherine Hill-Herndon for reason 1.4 (d ). 1. (C) Summary and

comment: On December 23, April 6 activist xxxxxxxxxxxx expressed

satisfaction with his participation in the December 3-5 \”Alliance of

Youth Movements Summit,\” and with his subsequent meetings with USG

officials, on Capitol Hill, and with think tanks. He described how

State Security (SSIS) detained him at the Cairo airport upon his

return and confiscated his notes for his summit presentation calling

for democratic change in Egypt, and his schedule for his Congressional

meetings. xxxxxxxxxxxx contended that the GOE will never undertake

significant reform, and therefore, Egyptians need to replace the

current regime with a parliamentary democracy. He alleged that

several opposition parties and movements have accepted an unwritten

plan for democratic transition by 2011; we are doubtful of this claim.

xxxxxxxxxxxx said that although SSIS recently released two April 6

activists, it also arrested three additional group members. We have

pressed the MFA for the release of these April 6 activists. April 6’s

stated goal of replacing the current regime with a parliamentary

democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections is highly

unrealistic, and is not supported by the mainstream opposition. End

summary and comment. —————————- Satisfaction with

the Summit —————————- 2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx expressed

satisfaction with the December 3-5 \”Alliance of Youth Movements

Summit\” in New York, noting that he was able to meet activists from

other countries and outline his movement’s goals for democratic change

in Egypt. He told us that the other activists at the summit were very

supportive, and that some even offered to hold public demonstrations

in support of Egyptian democracy in their countries, with xxxxxxxxxxxx

as an invited guest. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he discussed with the other

activists how April 6 members could more effectively evade harassment

and surveillance from SSIS with technical upgrades, such as

consistently alternating computer \”simcards.\” However, xxxxxxxxxxxx

lamented to us that because most April 6 members do not own computers,

this tactic would be impossible to implement. xxxxxxxxxxxx was

appreciative of the successful efforts by the Department and the

summit organizers to protect his identity at the summit, and told us

that his name was never mentioned publicly. ——————- A

Cold Welcome Home ——————- 3. (S) xxxxxxxxxxxx told us

that SSIS detained and searched him at the Cairo Airport on December

18 upon his return from the U.S. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, SSIS

found and confiscated two documents in his luggage: notes for his

presentation at the summit that described April 6’s demands for

democratic transition in Egypt, and a schedule of his Capitol Hill

meetings. xxxxxxxxxxxx described how the SSIS officer told him that

State Security is compiling a file on him, and that the officer’s

superiors instructed him to file a report on xxxxxxxxxxxx most recent

activities. ——————————————— ———-

Washington Meetings and April 6 Ideas for Regime Change

——————————————— ———- 4. (C)

xxxxxxxxxxxx described his Washington appointments as positive, saying

that on the Hill he met with xxxxxxxxxxxx, a variety of House staff

members, including from the offices of xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx),

and with two Senate staffers. xxxxxxxxxxxx also noted that he met

with several think tank members. xxxxxxxxxxxx said that xxxxxxxxxxxx’s

office invited him to speak at a late January Congressional hearing on

House Resolution 1303 regarding religious and political freedom in

Egypt. xxxxxxxxxxxx told us he is interested in attending, but

conceded he is unsure whether he will have the funds to make the trip.

He indicated to us that he has not been focusing on his work as a

\”fixer\” for journalists, due to his preoccupation with his U.S.

trip. 5. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx described how he tried to convince his

Washington interlocutors that the USG should pressure the GOE to

implement significant reforms by threatening to reveal CAIRO 00002572

002 OF 002 information about GOE officials’ alleged \”illegal\”

off-shore bank accounts. He hoped that the U.S. and the international

community would freeze these bank accounts, like the accounts of

Zimbabwean President Mugabe’s confidantes. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he wants

to convince the USG that Mubarak is worse than Mugabe and that the GOE

will never accept democratic reform. xxxxxxxxxxxx asserted that

Mubarak derives his legitimacy from U.S. support, and therefore

charged the U.S. with \”being responsible\” for Mubarak’s \”crimes.\”

He accused NGOs working on political and economic reform of living in

a \”fantasy world,\” and not recognizing that Mubarak — \”the head of

the snake\” — must step aside to enable democracy to take root. 6.

(C) xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed that several opposition forces — including

the Wafd, Nasserite, Karama and Tagammu parties, and the Muslim

Brotherhood, Kifaya, and Revolutionary Socialist movements — have

agreed to support an unwritten plan for a transition to a

parliamentary democracy, involving a weakened presidency and an

empowered prime minister and parliament, before the scheduled 2011

presidential elections (ref C). According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, the

opposition is interested in receiving support from the army and the

police for a transitional government prior to the 2011 elections.

xxxxxxxxxxxx asserted that this plan is so sensitive it cannot be

written down. (Comment: We have no information to corroborate that

these parties and movements have agreed to the unrealistic plan

xxxxxxxxxxxx has outlined. Per ref C, xxxxxxxxxxxx previously told us

that this plan was publicly available on the internet. End comment.)

7. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the GOE has recently been cracking down

on the April 6 movement by arresting its members. xxxxxxxxxxxx noted

that although SSIS had released xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx \”in the

past few days,\” it had arrested three other members. (Note: On

December 14, we pressed the MFA for the release of xxxxxxxxxxxx and

xxxxxxxxxxxx, and on December 28 we asked the MFA for the GOE to

release the additional three activists. End note.) xxxxxxxxxxxx

conceded that April 6 has no feasible plans for future activities.

The group would like to call for another strike on April 6, 2009, but

realizes this would be \”impossible\” due to SSIS interference,

xxxxxxxxxxxx said. He lamented that the GOE has driven the group’s

leadership underground, and that one of its leaders, xxxxxxxxxxxx, has

been in hiding for the past week. 8. (C) Comment: xxxxxxxxxxxx

offered no roadmap of concrete steps toward April 6’s highly

unrealistic goal of replacing the current regime with a parliamentary

democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections. Most opposition

parties and independent NGOs work toward achieving tangible,

incremental reform within the current political context, even if they

may be pessimistic about their chances of success. xxxxxxxxxxxx

wholesale rejection of such an approach places him outside this

mainstream of opposition politicians and activists.

SCOBEY02008-12-307386PGOV,PHUM,KDEM,EGAPRIL 6 ACTIVIST ON HIS U.S.